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Abstract 
People make decisions every day that have significant impact on others. The 
current experiment investigates the learning and decision-making processes involved 
when small groups confront a complex social dilemma under different learning 
conditions designed to imitate common educational interventions used in classrooms and 
non-laboratory settings. Participants (N=96) were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions. In the Explore-First condition (n=32), participants played one round of a 
simulated social dilemma board game before receiving a lesson on social dilemmas, then 
played a second round. In the Lesson-First condition (n=32), participants received the 
lesson before playing the game. In the Contrast condition (n=32), participants received 
the lesson without playing the board game. Participants in the Explore-First condition 
performed significantly better on a quiz assessing their conceptual understanding of 
social dilemmas and transfer to new dilemmas. Individuals in the Explore-First condition 
also found the lesson more interesting, and generally showed greater acceptance of public 
policies intended to improve ecological sustainability. Educational interventions to 
improve cooperation in social dilemmas may benefit from an initial exploratory phase, 
where individuals experience critical features of the problem before being taught about 
them.    
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Playing Games to Improve Conceptual Understanding and Cooperation in Social 
Dilemmas 
People’s decisions impact others, often without their awareness, and can create 
rivalry that harms society and the natural world. For example, the Ogallala aquifer in the 
Midwest U.S. provides about 30% of all water used in U.S. agriculture, but this resource 
is being used faster than it can be replenished. Many individual farmers are not fully 
aware of the collective impact that they are having on each other, or this limited, shared 
resource. Those farmers who are aware often compete over water for personal survival 
and economic viability, increasing rivalry (Royte, 2016). This kind of situation, where 
individuals are tempted and compelled by self-interest to destroy shared resources they 
rely on, is a social dilemma (Hardin, 1968).  
Resource based social dilemmas (resource dilemmas) such as the Ogallala aquifer 
are pervasive in society (Ostrom, 1998), and are a key factor in war, political and social 
unrest, and ecological collapse (e.g., Kelly et al., 2015). It is for this reason that scientific 
explanations for decision making are vitally important (Ostrom, 1998). One such 
explanation, classical rational choice theory (Hardin, 1968; Hobbes, T. 1651-1909), 
predicts that people are trapped in social dilemmas and will inevitably destroy the 
resource and themselves because they are too selfish to work together towards mutual 
benefit.  
However, research consistently shows that stakeholders in a social dilemma can, 
in fact, learn from experience to cooperatively solve these problems (Ostrom, 1998). 
Research also demonstrates that playing games that simulate the real-world dilemma one 
is in, as an experience-based teaching tool, can sometimes improve learning and facilitate 
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cooperation in the actual dilemma (e.g., García-Barrios et al., 2011; Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2018). However, the underlying social and cognitive mechanisms that promote successful 
learning and cooperation are poorly understood (Ostrom, 1998; Yu et al., 2016), making 
it difficult to design effective educational interventions.  
The current study uses experimental methods to investigate the decision making 
and learning processes involved when individuals confront a social dilemma situation. 
Our research project advances behavioral theory by using simulated social dilemma 
games to explore how people make complex decisions. By using a board game to let 
participants experience a social dilemma where their decisions will impact one another, 
this project will also identify new ways of educating the public on how to recognize the 
deeper underlying structure of social dilemmas. We will use exploratory and discovery-
based learning literature in education psychology to examine the role of exploratory 
learning in helping participants better learn the deep structure of social dilemmas.   
Decision Making in Social Dilemmas 
Traditional Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice Theory was born from the philosophical tradition of 
utilitarianism, which defines the best action as the one that provides the most utility. It 
assumes that actors are narrowly self-interested, and that they make their decisions 
rationally from a position of knowledge. The primary problem with this theory is that 
traditional RCT focuses nearly exclusively on financial and strategic elements of choice. 
RCT fails to convincingly account for widespread deviations from narrow self-interest, 
such as self-governance, where individuals band together while making agreements and 
devising their own effective solutions to social dilemmas (Ostrom, 2010). In addition, it 
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does not anticipate that individuals can learn from prior experience to positively, and 
holistically, constrain their individual self-interest for mutual benefit to a group and to the 
environment itself. If placed in a social dilemma, individuals are therefore expected to 
behave selfishly, destroying the shared resource and free riding on other people’s 
contributions to the group welfare (Hardin, 1968; Hobbes, T. 1651/1909). 
Bounded Rationality 
Bounded Rational Choice Theory (BRCT) emerged to account for the more 
nuanced nature of people’s values and cooperative decisions (Simon, 1972). BRCT 
acknowledges that self-interested individuals can learn with experience. BRCT also 
acknowledges that reality is subjective and socially constructed, and that differences in 
the way people perceive and understand their decisions influences their cooperative 
behavior in social dilemmas. Ostrom (1998) in particular argued that people can learn to 
trust one another and create social and rule-governed systems that facilitate long-term 
cooperation, despite their inherent self-interest and flawed cognitive faculties.  
The issue with BRCT is that it fails to examine fully the factors that contribute to 
a person’s value system and underlying motivations (e.g., fundamental social-
psychological needs; DeCaro, 2018). In addition, Ostrom’s (1998, 2005) BRCT was 
underdeveloped in terms of accounting for the hypothesized learning processes that 
decision makers engage in when learning how to solve complex social-ecological 
dilemmas. One such process is Bayesian Reasoning, wherein a person forms an initial 
mental representation of the situation (mental model; Jones et al., 2011) then revises their 
mental model based on experience, as more information about the situation and 
consequences of one’s actions become available (Berkson, 1930). Thus, people learn, but 
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it is not clear how they learn or what conditions facilitate such learning (Meinzen-Dick et 
al., 2018; Yu et al., 2016). More research needs to be conducted to clarify these 
motivational and learning processes. 
Humanistic Rational Choice 
Humanistic Rational Choice Theory (HRCT; DeCaro, 2018) extends Ostrom’s 
(1998, 2010) BRCT by explicitly incorporating broader value systems, perception 
systems, and learning processes from cognitive and social psychology and shown here in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Motivational Framework for Humanistic Rational Choice Theory. Reprinted from DeCaro, D. (2018). 
Humanistic rational choice and compliance motivation in complex societal dilemmas. (pp. 126-147). In S. Espinosa, S. 
Siddiki, & T. Heikkila (Eds.), Contextualizing Compliance in the Public Sector: Individual Motivations, Social 
Processes, & Institutional Design. Routledge. 
According to HRCT (see Motivational Subsystem, Figure 1; DeCaro, 2018), 
people look to government systems and each other to satisfy fundamental needs and 
manage social dilemmas well (e.g., Frey et al., 2004; Tyler, 2006). Mismanagement of 
social dilemmas and poor governance decrease perceptions of legitimacy and jeopardize 
these needs and well-being, motivating individuals to learn and try to solve the dilemma 
(DeCaro, 2019). people are inherently motivated to understand the world and solve 
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difficult problems that affect their core goals, fundamental needs, and well-being (e.g., 
Bandura, 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2017). When people learn and solve problems as a group it 
helps them internalize their motivations, which increases trust and cooperation. 
For example, consider the classic resource dilemma (Hardin, 1968), where 
farmers need to share a limited pasture for grazing their cattle. Each farmer seeks to make 
a profit, grazing as many cattle as they can. Hence, if any farmer feels that the rules or 
regulations that are used to restrict their individual grazing disadvantage them personally 
or fail to ensure that others comply with the rules, then their financial (economic) and 
security needs may be poorly satisfied, reducing cooperation. Moreover, if the farmers’ 
efforts to address their concerns through communication are perceived as unfair, then this 
can lead to a perception that the decision-making process is illegitimate, undermining 
their need for procedural justice (fair decision-making procedures) and self-
determination. Deficits to these fundamental needs, and recognition that the dilemma is 
not being managed well, should motivate individuals to try to correct the problem. 
Communication is a key element in correcting deficits in fundamental needs, as farmers 
reach out to their neighbors and political representatives to discuss solutions Such group 
cognition triggering the Bayesian (iterated) learning process identified by Ostrom (2005). 
Through this process, strictly competitive players may eventually learn mutually 
beneficial solutions to the dilemma. During this process, they should develop a better 
understanding of the critical social and ecological features of the problem. 
HRCT (DeCaro, 2018, 2019) also states that each person’s mental model, or 
conceptual representation of the decision situation and environment, affects their 
willingness to cooperate, specifically by altering perceptions of the situation and key 
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elements within it, as we see in the Mental Model Subsystem from Figure 1. An accurate, 
and shared, mental model of the situation is essential to successfully solving a social 
dilemma (Ostrom, 1998, 2005) and, ultimately, satisfying one’s fundamental needs (e.g., 
DeCaro et al., 2017). In the previous example, if farmers successfully update their mental 
model by learning important dynamics of the ecological problem, and better understand 
the social factors and dimensions of the dilemma that drive their behavior, then they may 
be able to cooperate better, improve their economic security and welfare, and sustain 
their resource. However, HRCT has not yet clarified the cognitive mechanisms involved 
in such learning, or the educational conditions that facilitate optimal learning.   
Learning Processes 
Social Learning 
 Behaviorists have long studied the link between the decisions a person makes and 
their history of learning (i.e., reinforcement and punishment; e.g., Hume, 1738; Skinner, 
1969). This link between learning and decision making is expressed as reciprocal 
determinism, wherein a person’s thoughts and feelings (i.e., cognates) both influence and 
are influenced by their own actions, as well as the actions of others in their environment 
(Bandura, 1978). Boyd and Richerson (2009) argue that cultural adaptation, the ability to 
learn from each other, developed over time and lead to natural selection within groups 
that increasingly favored pro-social behaviors. These cooperative social environments 
were shaped by social systems of rewards and punishments bound up in moral traditions 
and gave rise to complex internalized moderators like shame and empathy. This 
evolutionary model shows how behavioral mechanics and the development of social 
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norms serve to moderate competition and allow people to learn from their mistakes and 
each other in a social environment (Boyd, 2009). 
The relationship between behavior and social norms leads us to mental models, 
which are learned through interaction with others and refined via rewards and 
punishments (Bandura, 1978; Skinner, 1969). Mental models are shaped by social 
learning and can occur via communication, or through direct observation of other’s 
actions and the resulting consequences. Once mental models are well established, a 
person can become highly intractable in their views of the world and trapped in 
behavioral sequences that prevent them from being able to solve problems by employing 
new perspectives and methods (Nickerson, 1998). They may even fail to recognize the 
social nature of their problem, preventing them from taking the actions that would result 
in favorable outcomes for both themselves and others (Abrams et al., 1990). When a 
person’s social environment leads to such an uncooperative mental model this can lead to 
social-ecological dilemmas. 
People in a social-ecological dilemma make decisions and learn from one another 
and the environment, through ongoing interactions. These interactions are not always 
obvious to those involved and can lead to harmful outcomes. However, the dynamics that 
lead to more effective cooperation and compliance are not well understood. More 
research is needed to observe how individuals interact in a typical social-ecological 
dilemma, in order to identify potentially important cognitive and social learning 
processes (Anderies et al., 2011; Frey & Goldstone, 2018). Recent advancements in 
cognition and education, and exploratory learning, could provide additional insight into 
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the fundamental learning processes involved in mental model updating, and learning of 
important concepts in complex systems, like a social- ecological dilemma. 
Exploratory Learning 
 
 Traditional instructional in education relies on providing explicit instruction to the 
learner before having them solve a problem (e.g., providing a lecture on math before 
asking a student to solve an equation). However, learning from lecture is typically more 
superficial, and students often forget what they learn shortly thereafter (Dunlosky & 
Rawson, 2012). In order to promote deeper understanding, instructors are increasingly 
adopting active, or more discovery-based learning approaches. One such method, 
exploratory learning, changes the lesson order so that an initial problem-solving phase is 
followed by an instruction phase (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017). Exploratory learning is 
thought to promote an increased awareness of the deep structure inherent to the problem, 
as well as improvements in the learner’s ability to transfer what they have learned to 
other scenarios (Schwartz & Bransford, 1998). By letting the learner experience the 
problem space prior to receiving instruction, and by allowing the learner’s experience 
with the problem to inform future instruction, exploratory learning facilitates prior 
knowledge activation, awareness of gaps or errors in one’s knowledge and understanding, 
and recognition of deep problem features that are crucial to the solution (Loibl, Roll, & 
Rummel, 2017; DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2012).  
 For example, DeCaro and Rittle-Johnson (2012) tested the impact of exploratory 
learning with respect to children’s ability to solve unfamiliar math problems. They 
showed that exploration led children to have a greater understanding of their own ability, 
be more willing to try new strategies (DeCaro, DeCaro, & Rittle-Johnson, 2012), all of 
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which made them better prepared for future instruction. DeCaro and colleagues have 
replicated and extended these findings in undergraduate physics courses (Weaver, 
Chastain, DeCaro, & DeCaro, 2018). Though these previous studies examined conceptual 
knowledge development in math and science courses, we anticipate that similar learning 
mechanisms are involved in social dilemmas. 
Bayesian Reasoning  
 Ostrom’s (2005) initial theory of Bayesian reasoning provides a framework which 
combines the cultural evolution and exploratory learning perspectives discussed earlier in 
a way that helps explain the learning process involved in a social dilemma. Cultural 
pressures serve to shape a person’s mental model, and by extension their perceptions of a 
given situation, but people do possess the ability to learn from their experiences and 
revise such models in a process known as Bayesian Reasoning. 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between information, action-outcome linkages, and 
internal mental models. Reprinted from Ostrom, E. (2005). Animating Institutional Analysis. In Understanding 
Institutional Diversity (pp. 99-134). PRINCETON; OXFORD: Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom’s model, pictured in Figure 2, outlines the processes that influence a 
person’s decisions (Ostrom, 2005). Here, we focus on how an individual processes 
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information about the social-ecological dilemma situation, in light of previous 
expectations (e.g., mental models), and learns from prior experience. It is assumed that 
learning in a social-ecological dilemma is an iterated, reciprical process among the 
person, their environment (social and ecological), and the outcome of their prior actions 
over many trials (Bandura, 1978). Depending on the circumstances, experience may lead 
a person to revise their mental model in ways that improve their individual and collective 
success (e.g., individual earnings and cooperative outcomes), or increasingly hinder those 
efforts (i.e., people can learn from their mistakes but only if they see them as mistakes.  
This simple process of learning from trial-and-error experience, to update prior 
expectations, describes the basic concept of Bayesian Reasoning. Ostrom (2005) 
illustrates the Bayesian Reasoning process as a series of learning paths. According to 
Ostrom (1998), communication can help actors pool their information and gather more 
accurate understanding about the ecological dynamics of a social-ecological dilemma, 
updating the mental model and potentially leading to more effective resource 
management. In addition, actors may learn about others’ motivations and intentions, and 
be able to come to agreements that further clarify and constrain people’s behaviors, 
making the social and ecological situation more predictable and secure. If these actors are 
further able to communicate and govern in ways that satisfy needs for procedural 
fairness, belonging, and competence, then HRCT predicts cooperation will be 
internalized, developing robust cooperation (DeCaro, 2018).  
However, in order for positive learning outcomes to be achieved, it is imperitive 
that individuals accurately perceive and understand their own knowledge gaps and the 
deep structure of the social and decision-making environment when revising their model 
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of the situation (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017). This may be one way in which 
communication, as well as the method of educational instruction and learning, become 
crucial. Specifically, one of the goals of exploratory learning is to aid individuals in the 
process of understanding deep structures of complex problems by allowing a person to 
explore the problem space, learning from trial-and-error, as they attempt various solutions 
within their current conceptualization of the problem space (DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 
2012). Thus, exploratory learning may be particularly useful to individuals in a social 
dilemma situation, helping them to better learn from experience and understand 
underlying crucial features of the problem. 
Social dilemmas involving resource management are among the most complex, 
requiring a deep understanding from stakeholders (i.e., those who depend on the 
resource) of the interrelationship between the resource being managed and those who 
seek to utilize it (DeCaro et al., 2017; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2018). Failure to develop a 
sufficiently accurate mental model of such interrelationships can significantly undermine 
the stakeholder’s ability to contribute in a positive way towards managing the resource 
and may even lead to over use or depletion. Such a mental model deficit may also make it 
difficult or impossible for the stakeholder to address their fundamental needs within the 
collective action space, further eroding their ability to make meaningful contributions 
(DeCaro, 2018). For example, participants in our social dilemma simulation game who 
do not have an adequate understanding of the strains they collectively apply to the game’s 
forest resources, or their combined contribution to the siltation levels of the water 
resources, may not fully understand the need to reduce or restrict access when these 
resources are in danger of collapse. This misconception can lead to distrust between 
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players, undermining critical conservation efforts. On the other hand, with sufficient 
education and communication opportunities made available, the players involved may see 
potential collective action solutions that would otherwise be missed. The current project 
will investigate these processes, using a simulated social dilemma game. 
Using Simulated Social Dilemma Games to Encourage Learning 
 
A simulated social dilemma game emulates the core social and environmental 
elements of resource conflict (i.e., resource dilemma), or public service or good provision 
(i.e., public good dilemma), placing individuals in situations where they must interact 
with one another in competition, or cooperation. Because it is a game, groups can 
experience the social and environmental outcomes of their behavior, allowing them to 
learn from their actions, free from real world consequences.  
By giving individuals the opportunity to experience and explore a social dilemma 
in a relatively simple but relevant environment, simulation games could potentially 
bridge the gap in their mental models, allowing stakeholders to better understand the 
essential dynamics of a social-ecological dilemma and improving cooperative outcomes. 
Studies have used simulation games to increase core understanding and real-world 
efficacy with regard to resource dilemmas such as coffee farming (García-Barrios, Cruz-
Morales, Vandermeer, & Perfecto, 2017), ground water management (Meinzen-Dick, et 
al., 2018), and land usage (García-Barrios, García-Barrios, Waterman., & Cruz-Morales, 
2011). 
Luis García-Barrios developed a resource dilemma simulation game (Sierra 
Springs) using game theory principles. Sierra Springs is a simple way for stakeholders 
(i.e., people personally invested in the issue) to explore the interconnected social aspects 
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of resource usage and conceptualize expert instruction on solution sets to problems they 
may face regardless of their education levels (García-Barrios L., García-Barrios, 
Waterman, & Cruz-Morales, 2011). Garcia-Barrios et al. (2011) demonstrated that Sierra 
Springs can help improve communication between researchers and farmers towards 
coordinating strategies in response to land management dilemmas, while also allowing 
them to explore the social nature of such dilemmas and the impact that can have on 
solution set equitability. Garcia-Barrios et al. (2017) also examines how simulation style 
board games together with graphical and narrative based presentations can allow coffee 
farmers with little formal education to engage with scientists in gaining a deeper 
understanding of the complex social and ecological factors involved with their land and 
crops (García-Barrios, Cruz-Morales, Vandermeer, & Perfecto, 2017). Both studies show 
qualitative and quantitative benefits of adapting instruction methods to better reflect the 
learner’s life experience. 
These studies continue to be expanded into other resource dilemma scenarios such 
as groundwater management. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2018) explored how collective action 
games can increase cooperation between stakeholders, expand their understanding of the 
complex and interconnected factors involved in groundwater management, and improve 
sustainability over time. Their research, conducted in Andhra Pradesh, India, shows how 
communication within a simulation game can increase the likelihood of stakeholders 
achieving sustainable outcomes for ground water use. It is important to note that this 
increased cooperation did not become significant until the second year, and outweighed 
other behavioral factors such as trust levels, education levels, and gender. The study 
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found that use of simulation games can significantly increase the proportion of 
communities that adopt water registers and rules to govern groundwater use.  
 
Figure 3. A conceptual diagram of how feedback-driven learning occurs in SESs. The inner-loop (or single-loop) 
learning entails fine-tuning of specific strategies or actions to better meet existing goals or assumptions. The outer-loop 
(or double-loop) learning involves updating of goals or assumptions that underlie specific strategies. The circle with 
letter R represents the process of monitoring of and reflection on past outcomes. The arrow denoted by di represents 
internal issues (e.g., collective action problems). Environmental variability is represented by the arrows denoted by do 
(e.g., natural disasters). Several conditions, e.g., user participation in decision-making, knowledge sharing, etc., can 
influence the loop learning processes. Reprinted from David, J. Y., Shin, H. C., Pérez, I., Anderies, J. M., & Janssen, 
M. A. (2016). Learning for resilience-based management: Generating hypotheses from a behavioral study. Global 
Environmental Change, 37, 69-78. 
Yu et al. (2016) utilized a simulated resource dilemma task to investigate the 
relationship between collective action, learning strategies, and success under 
environmental variability. According to the model employed in the Yu et al. (2016) study 
we can see the relationship between the goals each member of a group sets, their strategy 
for achieving such goals, how those strategies interact with the social-ecological system 
itself, and how the outcomes they achieve are analyzed to improve future decision 
making. Important contributors to this process are the assumptions a person makes, their 
reflections on the situation they are in, and most importantly loop learning.  
Loop learning, as seen in Figure 3, refers to Bayesian feedback loops such as the 
reciprocal social learning outlined by Bandura (1978). The model employed by Yu et al. 
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(2016) is similar to Ostrom’s (2005) approach: it outlines two types of loop learning, 
inner-loop learning (entails fine-tuning of specific strategies or actions to better meet 
existing goals or assumptions), and outer-loop learning (involves updating of goals or 
assumptions that underlie specific strategies). Their research reveals that coordinated 
collective action and inner-loop learning elements, such as revised and shared strategies 
along with active monitoring of the social-ecological systems (SESs) involved, are 
enough for social-ecological success under stable conditions. Outer-loop learning is 
critical to social-ecological resilience in circumstances involving variability. In other 
words, the study employed a simulated social dilemma game to demonstrate that groups 
who are able to better revise their strategies in response to changing goals and 
assumptions are more successful than others when dealing with unpredictable 
circumstances (Yu, Shin, Pérez, Anderies, & Janssen, 2016).  
Our experiment looks at the impact of using a social dilemma simulation game to 
address flawed mental models that interfere with a person’s ability to solve problems by 
employing new perspectives and methods (Nickerson, 1998) or to recognize the social 
nature of their problem. This process relies on setting the person in a seemingly unrelated 
task, such as a game, and allowing them to exhaust their fixed methods trying to win at 
the game. They are given only minimal instruction in the beginning in order to allow 
them their own perspective of the action space, and only after they have reached an 
impasse are they guided towards new approaches. The most important aspect of this 
method involves a gradual association on the part of the person between the game they 
are participating in, and the larger social dilemma that it represents. The intent of this 
method is to bypass their previously held biases on a social dilemma, allowing them to 
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gain new outlooks and tools that will enable them to recognize a social dilemma more 
easily when they are in one. According theoretical developments in educational 
psychology, such exploratory learning may allow for deeper understanding of underlying 
concepts when compared to the more traditional explicit instruction (i.e., lecture then 
task) method of teaching (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017). 
Current Study 
  
The current study examined the role of exploratory learning, motivation, and 
social learning and perception in the development of conceptual knowledge, and 
promotion of cooperation, in a simulated resource dilemma. Participants learned about a 
real-world resource dilemma in the context of a board game and three different learning 
conditions: a Contrast condition, in which participants heard a lecture on the topic and 
board game, then read a detailed article about the real-world dilemma; a Lesson-First 
condition, in which participants were taught key concepts before playing the game; and 
an Explore-First condition, in which participants played the game before receiving the 
lesson.  
According to exploratory learning research, letting the learner experience the 
problem space prior to receiving instruction facilitates prior knowledge activation, 
awareness of gaps or errors in one’s knowledge and understanding, and recognition of 
deep problem features that are crucial to the solution (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017). 
Therefore, we anticipate that individuals will learn core concepts better when they have 
the opportunity to experience those concepts themselves. If better understanding of a 
social dilemma facilitates a perception of responsibility and efficacy to take action, then 
these participants may also show an increased willingness to support costly public 
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policies designed to ameliorate the social dilemma, and donate money to a relevant 
charity, if given the opportunity to do so. However, many other factors contribute to 
policy choice and action, so increased knowledge may not be sufficient (Cornforth, 2009; 
McKenzie-Mohr, 2000).  
According to HRCT, communication may not only improve understanding, but 
also facilitate cooperation, if used to devise fair and effective strategies and agreements 
for managing the limited resources in the dilemma (DeCaro, 2018, 2019). However, the 
current thesis project will focus on the learning processing and outcomes. Social-
psychological processes of cooperation will be addressed in later reports.  
We employed a Contrast condition in this study. The purpose of the contrast 
condition was to determine if the board game itself had an impact on any of the observed 
outcomes, beyond a more traditional lecture and read instructional format. We anticipate 
that the board game will increase participants core understanding of the social (i.e., self-
interest and interdependency) and ecological (i.e., limited resources and tragedy) 
dynamics involved in a social dilemma, resulting in higher performance from those who 
play the board game compared to those in the Contrast condition (García-Barrios L., 
García-Barrios, Waterman, & Cruz-Morales, 2011). 
A survey measuring motivations and perceptions (e.g., trust) was given to the 
Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions at the end of the experiment in order to assess 
change in fundamental social cognitions proposed by HRCT, as well as a quiz assessing 
their understanding of social dilemmas and ability to recognize other kinds of dilemmas. 
The Contrast condition also received a modified version of the survey without measures 
of perception, as well as the same quiz given to the other two conditions. The survey also 
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asked participants to indicate their willingness to support social and economic policies, 
such as restrictions on cattle grazing, economic fines for non-cooperation, and increased 
water conservation. Finally, as a potential measure of real-world cooperation, participants 
were given the opportunity to donate some of their earnings from the game to a relevant 
charity.  
Methods 
Participants and Design  
Data for this project was collected Fall 2018 (and is ongoing). Undergraduate 
students (N = 96, Age M = 19.06, 40.8% female) were recruited from the University of 
Louisville psychology subject pool. Due to recruitment constraints, we report the partial 
data for the experiment. Data collection will be completed later this semester (projected 
recruitment is 180 participants). Participants (N = 96) were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions; Explore-First (n = 32), Lesson-First (n = 32), or a Contrast condition (n 
= 32). Each session of the Lesson-First and Explore-First condition included four to eight 
participants, and random assignment was used to create one or two groups of four players 
each (N = 16 groups). Participants volunteered for 120 minutes and received research 
credit, in partial fulfillment of course requirements. In addition, participants were paid 
based on an in-game economy, to create a compelling economic resource dilemma that 
allows for competition and rivalry (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Participants could earn 
up to $16.75 based on their decisions in the game ($13) and learning quiz performance 
($3.75). This study was approved by the university IRB. 
Procedure 
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Figure 4. Illustration of conditions and order of events. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to condition. After completing informed 
consent in a waiting room where they were instructed not to speak with other 
participants, they were taken to a classroom with two tables and a viewing screen. In the 
Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions, tables were furnished with one copy each of 
the Sierra Springs board game. One score card for each player was provided. A laptop 
computer with an internal camera was set up and angled towards the gameplay board for 
recording each players actions and communication while retaining anonymity. A backup 
audio recorder was also utilized. Participants in all conditions received basic gameplay 
instructions, as well as a brief lesson on the nature of social dilemmas. These instructions 
were prerecorded for consistency, and approximately 18 minutes long. 
Individuals randomly assigned to the Explore-First condition played one 20-
minute session of the board game Sierra Springs (García-Barrios L. R., García-Barrios, 
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Cruz-Morales, & Smith, 2015), without the ability to communicate with other players, 
giving them the opportunity to experience the social dilemma first-hand. Afterward, they 
received a brief lesson on the nature of social dilemmas, intended to improve conceptual 
understanding of the social and ecological situation, and cooperation. They then played 
another 20-minute session of the game. During Game 2 they were able to communicate 
with each other. Levels of conflict and in-game cooperation were recorded, comparing 
Game 1 and Game 2. After playing both rounds of the game they were asked to complete 
a learning quiz and survey which were administered on a private computer station and 
given a donation opportunity. 
Individuals in the Lesson-First condition instead received the lesson before 
Game 1, so that they played the game as practice, or demonstration, of principles learned 
from the lesson. All other aspects of the two conditions were identical, so that exploration 
(order of lesson) was the only difference between conditions. After playing both rounds 
of the game they were asked to complete a learning quiz and survey which were 
administered on a private computer station and given a donation opportunity. 
Participants in the Contrast condition were given the same lesson on the nature 
of social dilemmas as the other two conditions, and then asked to read the National 
Geographic magazine article To The Last Drop (Royte, 2016). The article described an 
example of a cattle farming dilemma in the Ogallala Aquifer in the U.S. Midwest. 
Participants in the contrast condition did not play the board game. After completing the 
article, they were asked to complete a learning quiz and survey which were administered 
on a private computer station and given a donation opportunity. 
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Participants were given their payment for quiz and board game earnings in the 
form of a Visa pre-paid card before being completing the donation activity. Finally, all 
participants were provided with debriefing material, thanked for their help, and given the 
opportunity to ask questions about the study. 
Materials 
 Lesson. Participants in all conditions received basic gameplay instructions, as 
well as a brief lesson on the nature of social dilemmas based on the National Geographic 
magazine article To The Last Drop (Royte, 2016). The lesson was designed to teach key 
social aspects of a social dilemma such as self-interest and interdependence, as well as 
ecological aspects like resource scarcity and destructive consumption. These instructions 
were prerecorded for consistency, and approximately 18 minutes long. 
Resource Dilemma Game. To simulate a cattle grazing social dilemma, 
participants in the Explore-First and Lesson-First conditions played Sierra Springs 
(García-Barrios L. R., García-Barrios, Cruz-Morales, & Smith, 2015). We modified the 
game for the present study. In particular, we began each player with a number of cattle 
and timber tokens already on the board, and eliminated a mechanic involving the spring 
which feeds the creeks and provides drinking water for the farmers as we shown in 
Figure 5. These modifications were made to simplify and speed up game play in order to 
fit the constraints of our experiment. 
Four players take the role of cattle farmers, competing over land and water for 
economic gain. Each player has a designated plot as illustrated in Figure 5. In the 
beginning, the playing field is covered in forest tokens and some cattle. Players received 
$0.25 for each point earned. Each forest token is worth 1 point ($0.25); low cattle tokens 
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are worth 2 points ($0.50) and high cattle tokens are worth 3 points ($0.75). The players 
take turns deciding whether or not to place tokens, and where. Players generally graze as 
many cattle as they can to earn more points.  
It is possible for all players to earn 26 points ($6.50 per game), ensuring a stable 
and equitable use of the limited grazing fields. However, the actions each person takes to 
score points also come with economic and environmental costs. Each cattle placed on the 
board requires the removal of one forest token (i.e., deforestation). In addition, each 
player’s plot abuts two other players’ plots, with a shared stream supplying water to the 
cattle, as seen in Figure 5. Those spaces are allocated to players on a first-come-first-
serve basis, creating competition. Finally, deforestation and having too many cattle near 
water sources threatens players’ survival. If 68% (33) of the forest tokens are removed, 
then a catastrophic event is triggered: top soil becomes compacted and susceptible to 
mudslides that silt up waterways and make the area uninhabitable. All players lose (and 
their earnings are lost) if someone fails to correct the problem by removing one of their 
cattle tokens and replacing it with a forest token. In addition, if two adjacent players (e.g., 
Player 1 and Player 2) place a total of 3 cattle tokens on their shared creek, then the creek 
is threatened and all cattle on the creek will die (losing those points) unless one of those 
players immediately corrects the problem by removing a cattle token. These elements 
introduce four fundamental problem features characteristic of many social dilemmas: 
self-interest and competition, collective interdependency, scarcity, and ecological 
collapse (tragedy).   
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Figure 5. Initial board layout in our modified setup of The Sierra Springs game board.  
 
Communication. Communication is a powerful tool to help stakeholders in a 
social dilemma learn from experience and potentially devise cooperative solutions 
(Balliet, 2010). During Game 1 players in the Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions 
were not allowed to communicate. During Game 2 all players were able to talk directly to 
one another as they played. With permission of the participants, these conversations were 
audio recorded. In addition, we video recorded the board itself, to have a record of each 
player’s decisions (plays in the game). These data will be analyzed as part of another 
project, to identify potential agreements, exchange of information and social learning, 
and social interactions that influence fundamental motivations and behavior.   
Outcome Measures  
 Quiz. Participants completed a quiz to assess conceptual understanding of the 
defining social and ecological features of a resource dilemma and ability to apply 
(transfer) what they have learned to real-world social dilemmas (see Appendix A). The 
quiz consisted of fifteen multiple choice and three short essay questions. Participants 
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were paid for correct answers on the quiz to reward learning and ensure that participants 
tried their best (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Participants were informed of this payment 
during the informed consent process, during gameplay instruction, and again prior to 
finalizing the payment sheet for processing. Participants received $0.50 for each essay 
question they attempted, and $0.15 for each correct multiple-choice item, for a maximum 
of $3.75. The computer automatically scored the multiple-choice items and presented the 
score to the participant and experimenter at the end. Items were separated by social and 
ecological dimensions to emphasize potential differences in learning these dynamics.  
The Quiz questions are listed in Appendix A. 
Essay. Essay Questions 1 and 2 both assessed the key social and ecological 
dimensions of the dilemma. Question 1 asked participants to identify and explain the key 
features of a social dilemma. Question 2 asked participants to do the same specifically for 
the cattle farming board game. Essay Question 3 asked participants to explain how the 
cattle farming game represents a complex environmental situation, assessing their deeper 
knowledge of the ecological dynamics inherent to the dilemma. Items were separated by 
social and ecological dimensions to emphasize potential differences in learning these 
dynamics.  The results for essay question three were not reported in this paper due to the 
need for further analysis. 
Multiple Choice. Fifteen multiple choice items assessed participants’ 
understanding of the core social concepts and dimensions of the social dilemma, as well 
as their ability to identify their presence and implications in the cattle farming board 
game. These concepts included how their own decisions affect others (social 
interdependency) and self-interest (e.g., competition for shared land, lack of concern for 
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others’ welfare). One item (Question 4) was removed from the analyses, because in 
hindsight there was no single correct answer. Three additional items assessed participants 
understanding of the ecological dynamics involved in resource dilemmas and the cattle 
farming game in particular, including regional deforestation, localized creek collapse, and 
impacts of intensive cattle farming.   
 Transfer. Transfer items measured the ability of participants to transfer their 
understanding of the core features of social dilemmas to other kinds of social dilemmas. 
This step was important to assess the extent to which playing a simulated social dilemma 
helps to educate people about real-world dilemmas, as well as improve real cooperation. 
We used two items for assessing identification of resource dilemmas, three items for 
assessing identification of public good dilemmas, and one (foil) item for assessing 
discrimination between social dilemmas and other types of dilemmas.  
In particular, the transfer questions assess: (a) participants ability to recognize 
similar types of resource dilemmas in the real-world, such as the real-world Ogallala 
Aquifer cattle dilemma; (b) resource dilemmas in different sectors, for example, 
competition over fisheries, oil, or timber; (c) different kinds of social dilemmas, in 
particular, a public good dilemma, where individuals need to contribute time or personal 
resources (e.g., money) to produce something beneficial for everyone (e.g., blood 
donation, paying taxes); and (d) the ability of participants to distinguish social dilemmas 
from other kinds of societal problems and games that lack social interdependency (e.g., 
the game of solitaire, natural disaster).  
Interest, Enjoyment, and Engagement. Four survey items (α = .93) assessed 
participants’ level of interest, enjoyment, and engagement with the experiment, as a way 
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to determine how interesting and engaging participants found the three different learning 
conditions. These items were selected from a larger pool of items assessing motivation 
and perceptions that will be included in later projects.  
Policy Preferences. Six survey items assessed participants’ support of costly 
economic and conservation policies related to the cattle farming social dilemma. Item 1 
assessed willingness to support policies that reduce the number of cattle raised in the 
Ogallala Aquifer region of the United States. Item 2 assessed policies that monitor water 
use and require water conservation. Item 3 assessed willingness to pay higher prices to 
improve farmers’ livelihoods and environmental conservation, whereas Item 4 assessed 
willingness to pay higher prices to reduce the number of forests cut down to make room 
for farms. Item 5 assessed belief that cattle farming in the United States should continue 
operating like it currently is, and Item 6 assessed belief that cattle farming in the United 
States should be increased, with more cattle and more large-scale farms. 
Donation Activity. We identified charitable causes and organizations (See 
Appendix B) related to the focal social dilemma (cattle ranching, water scarcity), and 
other dilemmas. We carefully selected two charities that were directly related to 
economic, social, and economic sustainability of U.S. farming (Farm Aid, Cornucopia 
Institute); one charity that is related to environmental conservation in general (The 
Conservation Fund); and one charity related to social welfare (The Rotary Foundation). 
In addition, these charities accepted small online donations (necessary for the 
experiment), were highly regarded by third party charity report organizations (e.g., 
Charity Navigator), and did not explicitly take a particular political stance (e.g., 
conservative, liberal).   
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Participants were given the opportunity (choice) to donate some of their earnings 
to the charity, as a tangible indicator of cooperation. Donations were handled privately 
via computer, and blinded from the experimenter, so that individuals could make a 
voluntary decision free from social pressure (See Appendix B for procedures). The 
amount of money donated anonymously to charities at the end of the experiment was 
used to assess differences in participants’ understanding of deep mechanics within social 
dilemmas, as well as their ability to transfer what they have learned to real world 
dilemmas.  
Cooperation and Conflict. Communication will be analyzed at a later date, along 
with game play choices concerning threat events (such as deforestation and creek 
collapse), in order to explore overall cooperation levels between condition.  
Results 
Analyses 
These analyses are based on partial data and should therefore be considered 
preliminary results, or trends that will be finalized when data collection is complete. It is 
our judgment that there is sufficient data to do such preliminary analyses, and we will 
point out any analyses for which there is insufficient data to make observations on. In 
keeping with standard practice in education research and social dilemma research we 
report the overall significant tests for condition comparisons in this paper, but proceed to 
use planned comparisons of specific conditions, regardless of overall significance 
because we made a-priori predictions about the relationships between the conditions 
(Howell, 2011).  
Learning Quiz 
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 In this section, we report the findings for participants’ conceptual understanding 
as measured by multiple choice and essay quiz responses.   
Multiple Choice. Overall, there was a non-significant difference among 
conditions for multiple choice performance of social concepts, F(2,90) = 2.54, p = .085, 
2 = 0.05. there was also a non-significant difference among conditions for multiple 
choice performance of ecological concepts, F(2,90) = 3.30, p = .720, 2 = 0.01. However, 
because we made a-priori predictions about specific relationships among groups, we 
conducted planned comparisons to examine this potential trend further.  
Social Concepts. As illustrated in Figure 6, participants in the Explore-First 
condition (M = 83.07% correct, SE =1.61) performed significantly better than those in the 
Contrast condition (M = 77.01%, SE = 2.70), t(90) = 2.09, p = .039, ?̂? = 0.53, and 
marginally better than those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 78.13%, SE = 1.75), t(90) 
= -1.75, p = .083, ?̂? = 0.44. Scores of participants in the Contrast and Lesson-First 
conditions were not significantly different, t(90) = 0.38, p = .702, ?̂? = 0.10.  
 
Figure 6. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Ecological Concepts. When looking at the items that assess participants’ 
understanding of the ecological dynamics of social dilemmas, we found no significant 
difference in participant’s performance, F < 1, 2 = 0.01. As shown in Figure 7, 
participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 61.46% correct, SE = 2.64) did not 
significantly differ from those in the Contrast condition (M = 58.62%, SE = 2.70), t(90) 
= .709, p = .480, ?̂?  = 0.19. The same was found when comparing participants in the 
Contrast and Lesson-First conditions (M = 61.46%, SE = 3.03), t(90) = .709, p = .480, ?̂?  
= 0.19. When comparing participants in the contrast condition to those in the Explore-
First condition we see no statistical difference between the two conditions t(90) = .000, p 
= 1.00, ?̂?  = 0. 
 
Figure 7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Essay. I report the results of each essay question separately to illustrate 
participants’ general (Essay 1), and specific (Essay 2) conceptual understanding. The 
social and ecological dimensions of Essays 1 and 2 are emphasized to highlight the 
differential learning of these concepts.  
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Essay 1. Essay 1 assessed participants’ ability to identify four critical features of 
resource social dilemmas in general. We found a significant difference among conditions, 
F(2,90) = 6.50, p = .002, 2 = 0.13. As seen in Figure 8, participants in the Explore-First 
condition (M = 83.59%, SE = 4.71) displayed a significantly higher level of 
understanding than participants in the Contrast condition (M = 52.59%, SE = 7.27), t(90) 
= 3.60, p = .001, ?̂?  = 0.92, and those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 67.19%, SE = 
6.09), t(90) = 1.95, p = .05, ?̂?  = 0.40. The difference between participant performance in 
the Lesson-First and Contrast conditions was not significant: t(90) = 1.69, p = .09, ?̂?  = 
0.36. Given the moderately strong effect size, we believe this lack of significance is due 
to small sample size. 
Participants in all three conditions performed similarly in terms of their ability to 
identify key ecological features of a resource social dilemma, F < 1, 2 = 0.009. As seen 
in Figure 8, participants in the Contrast condition (M = 37.07%, SE = 7.30) did not show 
a significant difference from those in the Explore-First condition (M = 29.69%, SE = 
6.39), t(90) = -.767, p = .445, ?̂?  = 0.25, or the Lesson-First condition (M = 29.69%, SE = 
6.59), t(90) = -.767, p = .445, ?̂?  = 0.24. This lack of significance may be due to small 
sample size. Participants in the Explore-First condition showed no significant difference 
from those in the Lesson-First condition, t(90) = .000, p = 1.000, ?̂?  = 0.01. 
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Figure 8. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Essay 2. Essay 2 assessed participants’ ability to identify four critical features of 
resource social dilemmas that were particular to the simulated social dilemma board 
game. When we looked at the elements measuring understanding of social dimensions, 
we found a significant effect among conditions, F(2,90) = 5.77, p = .004, 2 = 0.11. As 
seen in Figure 9, participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 90.63%, SE = 3.51) 
displayed a significantly higher level of understanding than those in the Contrast 
condition (M = 63.79%, SE = 6.97), t(90) = 3.29, p = .001, ?̂?  = 0.84, as well as those in 
the Lesson-First condition (M = 71.88%, SE = 6.33), t(90) = 2.35, p = .021, ?̂?  = 0.59. 
Participants in the Lesson-First condition showed no significant difference from those in 
the Contrast condition, t(90) = .989, p = .325, ?̂?  = 0.25. 
When we looked at the elements measuring understanding of ecological 
dimensions, we found no significant difference among conditions, F < 1, 2 = 0.00. As 
seen in Figure 9, participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 71.09%, SE = 5.63) 
displayed no significant difference from those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 
68.75%, SE = 6.64), t(90) = .264, p = .792, ?̂?  = 0.07, or those in the Contrast condition 
Contrast Explore First Lesson First 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Mean Score: Social and Ecological Dimensions (Essay 1)
Social Dimensions
Ecological Dimensions
PLAYING GAMES TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING                         34 
 
(M = 68.97%, SE = 6.87), t(90) = 2.34, p = .816, ?̂?  = 0.06. Participants in the Lesson-
First condition did not significantly differ from those in the Contrast condition, t(90) = 
-.024, p = .981, ?̂?  = 0.01. 
 
Figure 9. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Transfer 
 
Resource Dilemmas. No significant difference among conditions was found when 
analyzing participants’ ability to identify resource dilemmas, F < 1, 2 = 0.01. A small 
but non-significant effect was found between participants in the Contrast condition (M = 
72.41% correct, SE = 5.31) and those in the Explore-First condition (M = 64.06%, SE = 
5.60), t(90) = -1.047, p = .298, ?̂?  = 0.27. This is seen in Figure 10. Participants in the 
Contrast condition showed no significant difference from those in the Lesson-First 
condition (M = 67.19%, SE = 5.77), t(90) = -.655, p = .514, ?̂?  = 0.17. There was no 
significant difference between participants in the Lesson-First condition and those in the 
Explore-First condition either, t(90) = .402, p = .689, ?̂?  = 0.10. 
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Figure 10. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Public Good Dilemmas. Overall, there was no significant difference among 
conditions, in terms of ability to transfer their knowledge of resource social dilemmas to 
identify public good dilemmas, F(2,90) = 2.16, p = .121, 2 = 0.05. However, as 
illustrated in Figure 11, for novel public good dilemmas participants in the Explore-First 
condition (M = 71.88% correct, SE = 4.99) performed significantly better than those in 
the Lesson-First condition (M = 57.29%, SE = 5.45), t(90) = -2.018, p = .047, ?̂?  = 0.50. 
Participants in the Explore-First condition did not score significantly higher than those in 
the Contrast condition (M = 67.82%, SE = 5.09), t(90) = 0.55, p = .585, ?̂?  = 0.14. The 
difference between participants in the Lesson-First and those in the Contrast conditions 
was not significant, t(90) = -1.420, p = .159, ?̂?  = 0.36. 
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Figure 11. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Foil. As we see in Figure 12, there were no significant difference between 
conditions on the foil item, F(2,90) = .12, p = .899, 2 = 0.002. Though not significant, 
participants in the Contrast condition had the highest percentage correct (M = 82.76%, SE 
= 7.14) compared to those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 81.25%, SE = 7.01), t(90) = 
-.147, p = .884, ?̂?  = 0.04, and those in the Explore-First condition (M = 78.13%, SE = 
7.43), t(90) = -.451, p = .653, ?̂?  = 0.12. There was no significant difference between 
participants in the Lesson-First condition and those in the Explore-First condition, t(90) = 
.312, p = .756, ?̂?  = 0.08. 
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Figure 12. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Interest, Enjoyment, and Engagement 
We found a significant effect when we looked at overall level of interest by 
condition, F(2,92) = 14.55, p < .001, 2 = .24. Participants in the Lesson-First condition 
(M = 5.98% correct, SE = .20) reported finding the experiment significantly more 
interesting than those in the Contrast condition (M = 4.48%, SE = .21), as did participants 
in the Explore-First condition (M = 5.70%, SE = .20). Participants in the Explore-First 
condition and those in the Lesson-First condition showed no significant difference, as 
seen in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Policy Preferences 
Question 1. This question looked at preference to support policies that reduce the 
number of cattle raised in the Ogallala Aquifer region of the United States. As we see in 
Figure 14, we found no significant difference by condition, F(2,90) = 1.56, p = .216, 2 = 
.03. Those in the Explore-First condition (M = 2.72%, SE = .15) were not significantly 
different than those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 2.38%, SE = .18), t(90) = 1.550, p 
= .125, ?̂?  = 0.38, or those in the Contrast conditions (M = 2.38%, SE = .14), t(90) = 
1.493, p = .139, ?̂?  = 0.38. There was no significant difference between participants in the 
Lesson-First and Contrast conditions, t(90) = -.019, p = .985, ?̂? = 0. 
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Figure 14. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Question 2. This question looked at willingness to support policies that monitor 
water use and require water conservation. As illustrated in Figure 15, there was a 
significant difference between conditions F(2,90) = 3.12, p = .049, 2 = .06. Participants  
in the Explore-First condition (M = 3.13%, SE = .14) showed a moderate and significant 
effect in willingness to support such policies when compared to those in the Contrast 
condition (M = 2.62%, SE = .182), t(90) = 2.246, p = .027, ?̂?  = 0.58, as did participants 
in the Lesson-First condition (M = 3.09%, SE = .15), t(90) = 2.107, p = .038, ?̂?  = .53. 
Participants in the Explore-First condition showed no significant difference from those in 
the Lesson-First condition, t(90) = .143, p = .887, ?̂?  = 0.05. 
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Figure 15. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Question 3. This question examined participants’ willingness to pay higher prices 
in order to improve farmers’ livelihoods and environmental conservation. As seen in 
Figure 16, there was no significant difference between conditions F(2,90) = .085, p = 
0.919, 2 = .002. Participants in the Lesson-First condition (M = 3.00%, SE = .19) 
showed no significant difference in willingness to support such policies when compared 
to the those in the Contrast condition (M = 2.90%, SE = .17), t(90) = .407, p = .685, ?̂?  = 
0.10, nor did those in the Explore-First condition (M = 2.94%, SE = .18), t(90) = .161, p = 
.872, ?̂?  = 0.04. Participants in the Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions showed no 
significant difference, t(90) = -.252, p = .802, ?̂?  = 0.06. 
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Figure 16. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Question 4. This question measured willingness to pay higher prices in order to 
reduce the number of forests cut down to make room for farms. As seen in Figure 17, we 
found no significant difference by condition F(2,90) = 1.65, p = 0.198, 2 = .04. 
Participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 2.81%, SE = .16) showed a small but 
non-significant effect in willingness to support such policies when compared to those in 
the Contrast condition (M = 2.38%, SE = .18), t(90) = 1.69, p = .094, ?̂?  = 0.43, and no 
significant difference from participants in the Lesson-First condition (M = 2.75%, SE = 
.20), t(90) = .250, p = .803, ?̂?  = 0.06. Participants in the Lesson-First condition also 
showed a small but non-significant effect when compared to those in the Contrast 
condition, t(90) = 1.448, p = .151, ?̂?  = 0.37.  
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Figure 17. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Question 5. This question asked about belief that cattle farming in the United 
States should continue operating like it currently is. Overall, we found no significant 
difference based on condition F(2,90) = .78, p = 0.460, 2 = .02. This is illustrated in 
Figure 18. Those in the Explore-First condition (M = 1.41%, SE = .10) showed a small 
but non-significant effect in their lower support for such a policy when compared to those 
in the Lesson-First condition (M = 1.59%, SE = .10), t(90) = -1.24, p = .216, ?̂?  = 0.30, 
and no significant effect compared to those in the Contrast condition (M = 1.52%, SE = 
.13), t(90) = -.718, p = .474, ?̂?  = 0.18. Participants in the Lesson-First condition showed 
no significant difference from those in the Contrast condition, t(90) = .495, p = .622, ?̂?  = 
0.12. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Mean Score: Policy Preference 4 (Survey)
Contrast
Explore First
Lesson First
PLAYING GAMES TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING                         43 
 
 
Figure 18. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Question 6. This question looked at belief that cattle farming in the United States 
should be increased, with more cattle and more large-scale farms. As shown in Figure 19, 
we found no significant difference based on condition F(2,90) = 1.55, p = 0.219, 2 = .03. 
Participants in the Contrast condition (M = 1.28%, SE = .14) showed a small but non-
significant difference in their lower support for such policies when compare to those in 
the Lesson-First condition (M = 1.59%, SE = .14), t(90) = 1.65, p = .102, ?̂?  = 0.41, and 
no significant difference from those in the Explore-First condition (M = 1.34%, SE = 
.12), t(90) = .35, p = .725, ?̂? = 0.08. Participants in the Explore-First condition showed a 
small but non-significant effect in their lower support for such a policy when compared to 
those in the Lesson-First condition, t(90) = -1.33, p = .186, ?̂?  = 0.33. 
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Figure 19. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Donation Amount. When looking at charitable donations, the Median donation 
amount was $0 in all conditions. In the Contrast Condition, 31% of participants (n = 10) 
donated, 25% of the participants in the Explore-First condition (n = 8) donated, and 40% 
of the participants in the Lesson-First condition (n = 13) donated. Given the very low rate 
of donation in each condition, there was not enough data to make any meaningful 
comparisons.  
Cooperation and Conflict. Communication and game play choices concerning 
threat events (such as deforestation and creek collapse) will be analyzed at a later date.  
Game Earnings. When looking at overall earnings between conditions F(1,62) = 
.101, p = .751, 2 = .002, the Median was $11.13.  
Discussion 
In this study we used multiple-choice and short answer essay questions, together 
with earnings and decisions from a simulated social dilemma board game to assess the 
impact of lesson order on participants’ ability to cooperate, learn core social dilemma 
concepts, and transfer what they have learned to other types of dilemmas. We examined 
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these measures across three different conditions: Lesson-First, which played two 20-
minute rounds of the board game after receiving a lesson on social dilemmas, Explore-
First, which played one 20-minute round of the board game before and after receiving the 
lesson, and a Contrast condition that received the lesson and read the article it was based 
on but did not play the board game at all.  
Some potential benefits of this research include informing our understanding of 
the relationship between exploratory learning and conceptual understanding in a problem 
space, thus shedding light on the dynamics that lead to more effective cooperation and 
compliance in social dilemmas. This preliminary report will be followed by additional 
data collection and analysis, with the belief that our current findings justify further study. 
Although many factors have yet to be analyzed do to time and complexity, and some 
failed to provide useful insight due to small sample size, we have, nevertheless, made 
several noteworthy observations. 
One encouraging finding of this study relates to participant’s significant ability to 
identify novel public good dilemmas in the Explore-First condition when compared to the 
Lesson-First condition. This suggests that the ability to explore the problem space before 
receiving the lesson increased conceptual understanding of how dilemmas occur beyond 
just the social dilemma that participants learned about. Participant’s motivation in 
learning tasks also showed a significant increase when using the simulated social 
dilemma board game. People assigned to the conditions that engaged with the board 
game reported higher levels of interest and enjoyment than those in the contrast group, 
which did not play the board game. This has important implications for teaching methods 
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that involve active learning tasks, suggesting that the board game increases engagement 
in learning about social dilemmas. 
When we looked at the essay question assessing understanding of social 
dimensions and ecological dimensions within a social dilemma, we found no significant 
difference between condition and ecological dimension understanding, but we did see a 
significant difference in understanding of social dimensions. Participants in both Explore-
First and Lesson-First conditions showed a greater understanding of social dimensions 
within a social dilemma than in the Contrast condition, with the Explore-First condition 
showing a significant advantage. This outcome was repeated in the essay question 
assessing understanding of social dimensions and ecological dimensions within the social 
dilemma simulation game, with no significant difference in ecological understanding but 
a significant advantage in social dimension understanding shown by participants in the 
Explore-First condition. This finding may be due to the way in which participants 
encounter the social dilemma in practice, and as a group in both Explore-First and 
Lesson-First conditions. They must navigate such social dimensions in order to play the 
game, whereas ecological dimensions must be triggered in order to learn from them. If 
groups did not trigger the ecological dimensions, such as creek collapse or deforestation, 
they would not learn from them. 
This benefit of exploration was also found on survey items related to policy 
preferences. We found a pattern whereby participants in both Explore-First and Lesson-
First conditions showed a greater willingness to support conservation-based policies than 
the Contrast condition. Those in the Explore-First condition tended to show more support 
for conservation-based policies, and less willingness to support non-conservation-based 
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policies than the Lesson-First condition. This finding continues to suggest that engaging 
with a simulation game has a positive impact on learning outcomes, and that exploration 
followed by instruction outperforms traditional lecture and task approaches for at least 
some learning outcomes. We believe that quiz scores may correlate with policy 
preferences such that those conditions that engaged with the game in general, and 
Explore-First in particular, gained a greater understanding of core social dilemma 
concepts which lead to greater preferences for policy solutions. This connection should 
be explored further as the research progresses. 
The multiple-choice findings are somewhat consistent with the essay findings. 
Some findings of interest from the multiple-choice items include a significantly higher 
ability for the Explore-First condition to recognize the core features of public good 
dilemmas. While not statistically significant, several other multiple-choice items trended 
towards the Explore-First condition, suggesting that further study could support an 
advantage in exploring first with regards to recognizing core problem features and 
transferring knowledge. The Contrast condition tended to perform worse than both 
Lesson-First and Explore-First, suggesting the use of a social dilemma simulation game 
has a positive impact on learning. When we looked at multiple choice items designed to 
assess learning by condition, we found many items that offered no significant findings. 
This may be due to our low number of participants, in which case we would expect a 
change in results as we move forward with further data collection. We hope to understand 
these effects better as this study progresses. 
This research holds implications for the way in which we approach teaching 
complex ecological concepts, and for developing tools to increase cooperation among 
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stakeholders. Using simulated social dilemma games appears to increase interest and 
enjoyment, while also leading to deeper levels of understanding with regard to certain 
elements inherent in such problems, such as social dynamics, and the importance of 
conservation. As we continue this study we hope to further explore and revise our 
understanding of the theoretical frameworks provided by HRCT and Ostrom’s concepts 
of Bayesian Reasoning and mental models. The practical benefits of this include a more 
robust knowledge of the processes that drive learning and cooperation, leading to the 
development of new techniques and materials that can be used in a variety of learning 
environments to help increase awareness and encourage greater support for conservation 
efforts. 
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Appendix A 
List of All Questions That Appear on the Learning Quiz 
 
Quiz Instructions 
 
** Important Instructions ** 
     
Next, we will test your understanding of key concepts. The questions in this quiz test 
your knowledge of concepts from the Cattle Farming Board Game, the real-world 
situation that the game is based on, and other information you saw or experienced in 
today’s experiment. 
  
The questions in this section have correct and incorrect answers.  
  
There are 3 short essay questions, and 15 multiple choice questions. You will be paid 
$0.50 (50 cents) for each short essay question, and $0.15 (15 cents) for each multiple 
choice question you answer correctly. If you answer all questions correctly, you can 
earn $3.75 for this quiz. Try your best to get each question correct.   
  
 
Quiz Short Essay Items 
 
Instructions: Short Essay Questions   
    
There are 3 questions in this section. You will receive $0.50 (50 cents) for each question 
in this section.   
 
Defining a Social Dilemma 
 
Item Prompt: What are the key features or characteristics of a situation that make it a 
social dilemma? Briefly explain each feature. 
  
 Click the box below to type your response. 
____________________ 
 
Defining a Social Dilemma Game 
 
Item Prompt: Briefly explain how the Cattle Farming Board Game is a social dilemma. 
What aspects of the game make it a social dilemma? Give examples from the game to 
explain your answer. 
  
 Click the box below to type your response. 
____________________ 
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Defining Environmental Complexity 
 
Item Prompt: Briefly explain how the Cattle Farming Board Game is a complex 
environmental situation. 
  
 Click the box below to type your response. 
____________________ 
 
 Quiz Multiple Choice Items 
 
 Instructions: Multiple Choice Questions   
 
There are 15 questions in this section. You will receive $0.15 (15 cents) for each question 
you anwer correctly.    
 
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 1 
 
Item Prompt: What is a social dilemma? Choose the single best answer.  
 
1. A situation where one person does not get what he or she wants. 
2. A situation where people are fighting.  
3. A situation where individual goals conflict with what is best for the group. 
4. All of the above. 
 
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 2 
 
Item Prompt: Which of the following situations is a Resource Dilemma? Choose the 
single best answer. 
 
1. Each roommate in a sorority house needs to contribute some time and energy to get all 
the chores done. 
2. Students in the library must wait for an open computer station, in order to use a 
computer. 
3. Several students enter a bus, and there are plenty of seats for everyone. 
4. Several students are having an argument about something they learned in class.  
 
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 3 
 
Item Prompt: True or False: In social dilemma situations like the cattle farming situation 
in the United States’ Ogallala Aquifer and the Cattle Farming Board Game…  
 True or False 
 True False 
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People’s decisions do not 
affect other people.  o  o  
Cooperation is guaranteed.   o  o  
If each person acts 
selfishly, everyone could 
suffer.  
o  o  
Groups get better outcomes 
(e.g., more money) if 
everyone works together.  
o  o  
 
 
 
 
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 4 
 
Item Prompt: In the Cattle Farming Board Game, one of the Players tends to have an 
advantage in the game. Who is it? 
 
1. Player 1. 
2. Player 2.  
3. Player 3. 
4. Player 4. 
 
 
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 5 
 
Item Prompt: Here is a picture of the Cattle Farming Board Game. Which Players can 
affect Player 1’s earnings? Select all that apply.   
 
▢ Player 1  
▢ Player 2  
▢ Player 3  
▢ Player 4  
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Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 6 
 
Item Prompt: In the United States, some of the actions cattle farmers take directly (or 
indirectly) increase competition and make it harder for other farmers to earn money.  
  
 Use what you have learned today about cattle farming to select each action that increases 
competition among farmers. Select all that apply. 
   
 Does this increase competition? 
 Yes No 
Putting a lot of cattle in a 
single area of your pasture.  o  o  
Cutting down a few trees 
from your forest for timber.  o  o  
Letting your cattle drink 
from the creek that is 
shared between you and 
other farmers. 
o  o  
Cutting down a forest to 
make room for more cattle 
on your pasture. 
o  o  
Removing some cattle from 
your pasture and planting 
some new trees/forests.  
o  o  
 
 
Multiple Choice: Ecological Dilemma Item 1 
 
Item Prompt: What happens when a lot of forests are cut down to make room for more 
cattle? Choose the single best answer. 
 
1. There is more open land for cattle grazing, so the farmers can earn even more money 
by taking more cattle to the market. 
2. The area cannot sustain the cattle or farmers because the soil and land becomes barren. 
3. More forests will grow back and replace the old forests. 
4. Nothing. The number of trees or forests has no effect on cattle or farmers. 
 
Multiple Choice: Ecological Dilemma Item 2 
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Item Prompt: In the Cattle Farming Board Game, why can’t you place two High Cattle 
Tokens near each other (connected by a line) in the pasture? Choose the single best 
answer. 
 
1. There would be too many cattle to sustain enough plant life to feed the cattle.  
2. There is not enough physical space for the cattle. They do not fit. 
3. Having too many cattle attracts predators that might eat the cattle. 
4. Having too many cattle in one area creates an over-supplied market, decreasing their 
value. 
 
 
Multiple Choice: Ecological Dilemma Item 3 
 
Item Prompt: In the Cattle Farming Board Game, what happens if there are two cattle 
tokens in the same creek? Choose the single best answer. 
 
1. Players (farmers) can continue to put as many cattle on the creek as they want until it is 
full. 
2. The cattle have access to fresh water, so they become healthier (High Cattle Tokens), 
which are worth more money at the market. 
3. If anyone puts more cattle on the creek, the creek will dry up and the cattle will die. 
4. Nothing. Players (farmers) are not allowed to put any cattle in the creeks, because of 
pollution it might cause. 
 
Instructions Social Dilemma Items 
 
Instructions: Identifying Social Dilemmas 
  
Next, we would like to see your ability to recognize real-world social dilemmas. 
Some of the situations we show or describe in this section are social dilemmas like 
the one in the cattle farming board game, others are different kinds of social 
dilemmas, and others are not dilemmas at all.  
  
 Please try your best to identify the social dilemmas.  
  
 You will earn $0.15 (15 cents) for each correct answer.    
  
 
Dilemma 1: Fossil Fuel Common Pool Resource Dilemma 
 
Item Prompt: Most people in the world use fossil fuels (e.g., petroleum and oil) to fuel 
their vehicles, transport goods, and power machinery for making other goods. There is a 
limited supply of fossil fuel in the world. Many countries, companies, and people want to 
use the valuable fossil fuels. 
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Is this a social dilemma? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Dilemma 2: Black Friday Common Pool Resource Dilemma 
 
Item Prompt: On Black Friday in the U.S., a limited number of highly desired electronics 
(e.g., video game systems, televisions) go on sale for one day. These products are 
discounted substantially, so many people come to stores, camping out the night before, in 
order to be the first person to get in the store and reach the sale items.   
 
Is this a social dilemma? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Dilemma 3: Water Public Good Dilemma  
 
Item Prompt: The City of Louisville needs to raise about $4.3 Billion in order to fix old 
water delivery pipes and sewer pipes, pumps, and water treatment facilities. To do this, 
the City may raise taxes, and the Metropolitan Sewer District may raise its monthly fees. 
Everyone would benefit from improved water systems, even people who do not pay for 
them, or pay less.  
  
Is this a social dilemma? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Dilemma 4: Blood Drive Public Good Dilemma  
 
Item Prompt: In a typical blood drive, hospitals would like as many people as possible to 
donate blood for people who need a blood transfusion in a medical emergency. Everyone 
can benefit from the blood that is donated, but few people donate their blood.  
  
Is this a social dilemma? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Dilemma 5: Group Project Public Good Dilemma  
 
Item Prompt: Instructors sometimes require their students to work in groups, for a group 
project. Everyone in the group gets the same grade, even students that do not do as much 
work.  
  
Is this a social dilemma? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Dilemma 6: Party Foil 
  
Item Prompt: A group of college students has gathered for a party. There are a lot of 
people there, and just as many boxes of pizza, bags of chips, drinks and other food for 
everyone. The party is being held in one of the largest sorority houses on campus, late 
into the night. A few people get into an argument about something one of them posted 
online in social media. 
  
Is this a social dilemma? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Appendix B 
List of Charitable Organizations Participants Could Donate to 
Participants were given the opportunity (choice) to donate some of their in-game earnings 
to the charity, as a tangible indicator of cooperation. Donations were handled privately 
via computer, and blinded from the experimenter, so that individuals could make a 
voluntary decision free from social pressure. The amount of money donated anonymously 
to charities at the end of the experiment was used to assess differences in participant’s 
understanding of deep mechanics within social dilemmas, as well as their ability to 
transfer what they have learned to real world dilemmas.  
1. Farm Aid 
Farm Aid’s mission is to keep family farmers on the land. We’re best known for our 
annual music, food and farm festival, but the truth is we work each and every day, 
year-round to build a system of agriculture that values family farmers, good food, soil 
and water, and strong communities. Learn more about our day-to-day work to 
celebrate and strengthen farmers, advocate for fair farm policies, connect farmers and 
eaters, and bring family farm food to everyone. 
Click Link:  https://www.farmaid.org/our-work/     *Scroll to middle of page to find 
donation area. 
 
2. The International Union For the Conservation of Nature 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is a membership union 
uniquely composed of both government and civil society organisations. It provides 
public, private and non-governmental organisations with the knowledge and tools that 
enable human progress, economic development and nature conservation to take place 
together. Our experts are organised into six commissions dedicated to species 
survival, environmental law, protected areas, social and economic policy, ecosystem 
management, and education and communication. 
Click Link: https://www.iucn.org/donate  *To enter your own dollar amount, look for 
the empty box. 
 
3. The Cornucopia Institute 
The Cornucopia Institute engages in educational activities supporting the ecological 
principles and economic wisdom underlying sustainable and organic agriculture. 
Through research and investigations on agricultural issues, the Cornucopia Institute 
provides needed information to consumers, family farmers, and the media. 
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Click Link: https://www.cornucopia.org/donate/ 
 
4. The Rotary Foundation  
 
The Rotary Foundation is a not-for-profit corporation funded solely by voluntary 
contributions from members and friends of Rotary who support its mission to advance 
world understanding, goodwill, and peace. Using Rotary Foundation grants, Rotary's 
34,000 clubs across the globe develop and carry out sustainable humanitarian projects 
and provide scholarships and professional training opportunities that promote peace, 
fight disease, provide clean water, sustain mothers and children, improve education, 
and strengthen local economies.  
 
Click Link: https://my.rotary.org/en/donate 
 
 
If you make a donation, be sure to close the webpage when you finish. And, fill out 
the confidential Donation Form, which is on the desk. 
 
 
